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ABSTRACT
Does limited access to formal savings services impede business growth in poor countries? To shed
light on this question, we randomized access to non-interest-bearing bank accounts among two types
of self-employed individuals in rural Kenya: market vendors (who are mostly women) and men working
as bicycle-taxi drivers. Despite large withdrawal fees, a substantial share of market women used the
accounts, were able to save more, and increased their productive investment and private expenditures.
We see no impact for bicycle-taxi drivers. These results imply significant barriers to savings and investment
for market women in our study context. Further work is needed to understand what those barriers are,
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Hundreds of millions of people in developing countries earn their living through small-scale
business (World Bank, 2004; de Soto, 1989). Many of these entrepreneurs do not have access
to even the most basic of ﬁnancial services, such as a simple bank account in which they
can save money.1 Given that many entrepreneurs need to save up daily proﬁts for lumpy
investments or set aside some money to use for unexpected shocks, is it possible that not
having a place to save securely impedes business success?
In this paper, we test this directly by expanding access to bank accounts for a randomly
selected sample of small informal business owners in one town of rural Western Kenya. The
sample is composed primarily of market vendors (the great majority of whom are women)
and bicycle-taxi drivers (all of whom are men), and includes 250 individuals in total. We use
two main data sources to measure impacts: administrative data from the bank on account
usage, and a rich dataset constructed from daily logbooks which were kept by respondents.
The logbooks include detailed information on many outcomes, including formal and informal
savings, business investment, and expenditures.2
There are three main ﬁndings. First, market women in the treatment group used the bank
accounts quite actively, and increased their total savings on average. Treated bicycle-taxi
drivers (all of whom were men) used the accounts much less and did not increase their total
savings. The high account usage rate among market women is especially noteworthy because
the account did not pay out any interest and included substantial withdrawal fees, so that
the de facto interest rate on deposits was negative (even before accounting for inﬂation).3
Clearly, if female vendors did not have trouble saving on their own, they should not have
paid the bank for the right to save. That they voluntarily did so suggests that they face
negative private returns on the money they save informally.
Second, market women in the treatment group substantially increased their investment
in their business relative to the control group. Our most conservative estimate of the eﬀect
is equivalent to a 38-56% increase in average daily investment for market women after 4-6
months. While this point estimate is very large, the standard errors are also quite large
and the conﬁdence interval includes both reasonable and less reasonable eﬀect sizes. Our
focus is thus on the fact that we see a substantial positive impact, rather than on its exact
1Though there is little evidence for entrepreneurs speciﬁcally, several studies show extremely low levels
of ﬁnancial access for the broader population in developing countries (Chaia et al., 2009; Kendall et al.,
2010). With regards to Africa more speciﬁcally, Aggarwal et al. (2011) use the Gallup World Poll to show
that only 15% of people in Sub-Saharan Africa have a bank account.
2The logbooks are similar to the ﬁnancial diaries used in Collins et al. (2009).
3Inﬂation in Kenya was between 10 and 14% between 2006 and 2009, the time period of this study (IMF,
2010).
1magnitude.4
Third, market women in the treatment group had signiﬁcantly higher expenditures than
market women in the control group. After four to six months, daily private expenditures
were about 37% higher for market women in the treatment group.
This study is the ﬁrst randomized ﬁeld experiment estimating the eﬀect of expanding
access to basic savings accounts. There have, however, been a number of recent randomized
controlled trials which look at the eﬀects of increased access to credit. Our ﬁndings con-
trast with those studies in two ways. First, studies exploiting the randomized expansion of
microcredit have observed relatively low take-up: 27% of households in urban India (Baner-
jee et al., 2009) and 16% of households in Morocco (Crépon et al, 2011) took out a loan
when barriers to access were lowered. In rural Kenya, less than 3% of individuals initiate
a loan application even after receiving assistance with the collateral requirement (Dupas et
al., 2012). In contrast, 87% of people took up the savings account we oﬀered, and 41% made
at least two transactions within the ﬁrst six months of getting the oﬀer.5
Second, while we ﬁnd evidence that savings access helps increase business investment,
evidence on the impact of credit on microentrepreneurs so far has been quite mixed. Karlan
and Zinman (2010a, b) exploit randomized access to credit in an urban area in the Philip-
pines, and see no eﬀect of microcredit access on business investment; rather, they ﬁnd some
evidence that the size and scope of businesses shrink when their owner gets a loan.6 In con-
trast, Banerjee et al. (2009) ﬁnd positive (though still quite small in absolute magnitude)
impacts on business creation and purchase of business durables by business owners. Finally,
Kaboski and Townsend (2011) evaluate a natural experiment which increased credit access in
rural Thailand. They ﬁnd large consumption impacts, but no change in overall investment.
The only randomized controlled trial to ﬁnd large, positive impacts thus far is Attanasio et
al. (2012) in Mongolia.
There have also been a few non-experimental studies estimating the impact of provid-
ing comprehensive ﬁnancial services (i.e., both savings and credit) on income (Burgess and
Pande, 2005, in India; Bruhn and Love, 2009, and Aportela, 1999, in Mexico; and Kaboski
and Townsend, 2005, in Thailand). Our paper adds to this literature by providing exper-
4Note however that qualitative debrieﬁng interviews with women who saw large increases in business
size supported the quantitative estimates.
5This higher demand for saving than credit supports the results of earlier observational studies, such
as Johnston and Morduch (2008), who show that 90% of Bank Rakyat Indonesia clients save but do not
borrow; or Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch (2010), who argue that some women in India take up microcredit
schemes as a way of forcing themselves to save through required installment payments (rather than to access
credit for use in a business).
6The authors explain this negative impact as follows: increased access to credit reduced the need for favor-
trading within family or community networks and thereby enabled business owners to shed unproductive
workers.
2imental evidence that providing basic saving services alone might be an important tool in
poverty alleviation.
Our ﬁndings raise a number of issues that remain to be explored. First, what are the
key savings barriers that bank accounts help overcome? Do people have diﬃculty saving
because they have present-biased preferences and over-consume cash on hand, as has been
shown to be the case for at least 10% of women in the Philippines (Ashraf, Karlan, and
Yin, 2006)? Or do they have diﬃculty protecting their savings from demands from others
(Platteau, 2000)?
Second, and relatedly, while the private return on savings at home appears to be negative,
the social return could be zero: every dollar given out to a relative or social contact who asks
for it is ultimately spent. Savings accounts only improve welfare if they make it more likely
that money is spent where it has the highest return (for example, if it allows a relatively
high-return entrepreneur to increase investment) or if it reduces money spent on consumption
that people later regret (temptation goods, for example). This implies that the welfare
implications of increasing access to formal saving services to a subset of the population are
ultimately unclear – while market women in the treatment group were clearly better oﬀ, the
impact on other members of their social network is uncertain. They could beneﬁt in the long
run from the higher resources generated by women through their expanded businesses, but
they may suﬀer in the short run from receiving lower transfers.
Third, how generalizable are these results? Within our own sample, we ﬁnd important
heterogeneity by occupation, with no eﬀect for bicycle taxi drivers and large eﬀects for
female market vendors (we lack precision to estimate the importance and impact of saving
constraints for male vendors). How would other segments of the population (for example,
farmers) be aﬀected by access to savings services? We leave more thorough investigation of
these issues to future work.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We ﬁrst describe the experiment and the data
in Section 2, before presenting the main results in Section 3. Section 4 presents the panel
data evidence on risk-coping. Section 5 discusses potential mechanisms and open questions,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Data Collection
2.1 Study Location and Study Population
The study took place in and around Bumala Town in Busia district, Kenya. Bumala Town
is a rural market center located along the main highway connecting Nairobi, Kenya, to
3Kampala, Uganda, and it has a population of around 3,500, making it the ﬁfth largest town
in Busia district and the 189th largest town in Kenya.7
As this project was focused on non-farm microenterprises rather than on a more gen-
eral population, our sample consisted solely of daily income earners. We decided to focus
in particular on vendors and on bicycle taxi drivers, which are two popular types of own
enterprises in Bumala Town. Though there are many other types of businesses in the area,
we focused on these two types because the production function is similar across businesses
within each type.
The scale of operations for individuals in our sample is quite small. For those involved in
vending, the mean number of items traded is just below 2, and the median is 1 (the majority
of vendors sell just one item, such as charcoal or a food item like dried ﬁsh or maize). Mean
daily investment is just US $6 per day. For bicycle-taxi drivers, mean investment is limited
to bicycle repairs, which amount to only US $1 per day on average. Most of the individuals
in our sample own a small plot of land and are involved in subsistence farming in addition
to their business. The main staple crop cultivated is maize.
2.2 Background on formal and informal savings in Western Kenya
Most self-employed individuals in rural Kenya do not have a formal bank account. At the
onset of this study, only 2.2% of individuals we surveyed had a savings account with a
commercial bank. The main reasons given for not having an account were that formal banks
typically have high opening fees and have minimum balance requirements (often as high as
500 Ksh, or around US $7). Savings accounts are also oﬀered by savings cooperatives, but
the cooperatives are usually urban and employment based, and therefore rarely available for
rural self-employed individuals.
Instead, individuals typically save in the form of animals or durable goods, in cash at
their homes, or through Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), which are
commonly referred to as merry-go-rounds.8 Most ROSCAs have periodic meetings, at which
members make contributions to the shared saving pool, called the “pot”. The pot money is
given to one member every period, in rotation until everyone has received the pot. ROSCA
participation is high in Kenya, especially among women, and many people participate in
multiple ROSCAs (Gugerty, 2007).
In our sample, 87% of respondents report that “it is hard to save money at home”, and
ROSCA participation) is widespread, especially among women (Table 1).
7See http://kenya.usaid.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/proﬁles/Busia_Dec2011%2020.pdf
8It is very common for people around the developing world to use these types of mechanisms as primary
savings mechanisms (Rutherford, 2000).
42.3 The Village Bank
We worked in collaboration with a village bank (also called a Financial Services Association,
or FSA) in Bumala Town. The Bumala FSA is a community-owned and operated entity
that receives support (in the form of initial physical assets and ongoing audit and training
services) from the Kenya Rural Enterprise Development Agency, an aﬃliate of the Kenyan
microﬁnance organization KREP. The FSA is the only ﬁnancial institution present in the
study area. Commercial bank branches are available in the next town (Busia), located about
25 kilometers away.
At the time of the study, opening an account at the village bank cost 450 Ksh (US $6.40).
The village bank did not pay any interest on the savings account. However, the bank charged
a withdrawal fee (of US $0.50 for withdrawals less than US $8, $0.80 for withdrawals between
$8 and $15, and $1.50 for larger withdrawals), thus generating a de facto negative interest
rate on savings. The bank was open from Monday to Friday from 9am to 3pm, and did not
provide ATM cards or any opportunity to deposit or withdraw money at any time outside
these working hours, making bank savings somewhat illiquid – savings could not be accessed
for emergencies which occurred on the weekend or after 3pm.
The village bank opened in Bumala Town in October 2004. By the time this study began
in early 2006, only 0.5% of the daily income earners that we surveyed around Bumala Town
had opened an account at the village bank. The main reasons given by respondents for why
they did not already have an account were inability to pay the account opening fee, and lack
of information about the village bank and its services.9
Note that access to credit is also extremely limited in the study area. At the time of the
study, there was no microcredit agency lending to people in our sample. Only those with a
bank account at the Village Bank could potentially be eligible for a loan, but the eligibility
criteria were extremely stringent. Consequently, very few people in our study received credit
during the sample period.
2.4 Sampling
The sampling was done in three waves, in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. Given that
we had only a limited budget for data collection, in each wave we sampled people up to
the point that we had enough staﬀ to oversee the daily logbook data collection exercise
(the logbooks, as we discuss below, were costly to administer because they required a high
9Cole, Sampson and Zia (2011) combine experimental and survey evidence from India and Indonesia to
argue that the demand for bank savings accounts is not constrained by lack of ﬁnancial literacy, but rather
by high prices.
5ratio of well-trained enumerators to respondents). To draw the sample, enumerators were
assigned speciﬁc areas in and around Bumala town, and asked to identify market vendors
and bicycle-taxi drivers operating there. They administered a background survey to these
individuals upon identifying them.10 Those that already had a savings account (either at the
village bank itself or some other formal bank) were excluded from the sample. This criterion
excluded very few individuals: as mentioned above, only 2.2% of individuals had accounts
in a commercial bank and 0.5% had accounts in the FSA. After excluding these individuals,
our ﬁnal sample frame consisted of 392 individuals: 262 female vendors, 92 male bicycle
taxi drivers, and 34 male vendors (see Appendix Table A1). This represents only a small
share of the total population in Bumala Town, and a small share of vendors and bicycle taxi
drivers.11
2.5 Experimental Design and Timeline
Individuals in the sample frame were randomly divided into treatment and control groups,
stratiﬁed by gender and occupation (gender and occupation are very highly correlated in
the sample, since all women in the sample are market vendors and 89% of market vendors
in the sample are female). Those sampled for treatment were oﬀered the option to open an
account at the village bank at no cost to themselves – we paid the account opening fee and
provided each individual with the minimum balance of 100 Ksh (US $1.43), which they were
not allowed to withdraw. Individuals still had to pay the withdrawal fees, however. Those
individuals that were sampled for the control group did not receive any assistance in opening
a savings account (though they were not barred from opening one on their own).12
The timing was as follows. In Wave 1, the background survey was administered in Febru-
ary and March 2006, and accounts were opened for consenting individuals in the treatment
group in May 2006. In Wave 2, the background survey was administered in April and
May 2007 and accounts were opened in June 2007. In Wave 3, the background survey was
administered in July and August 2008 and accounts were opened in June 2009.13
10We did not keep track of the number of individuals that were approached but refused to be surveyed,
but reports from enumerators suggest that refusals were very rare at the enrollment stage.
11In a census of ROSCA participants around Bumala Town that we conducted for a separate study (Dupas
and Robinson, 2012), we identiﬁed over 800 female vendors. Records kept by Bumala’s Boda association
indicate that over 300 bodas were registered in 2007.
12Within the study period, three individuals in the control group opened accounts in the village bank on
their own.
13After the data had been collected, control individuals in each wave were given the option to open a
savings account free of charge as compensation for participating in the study, but this was not anticipated.
62.6 Data
We use four sources of data. First, our background survey includes information on the
baseline characteristics of participants, such as marital status, household composition, assets,
and health. Second, we have administrative data from the village bank on every deposit and
withdrawal made in all of the treatment accounts.14
Third, we elicited time and risk preferences from respondents, as well as cognitive ability
measures.15 The time preference questions asked respondents to decide between 40 Ksh now
(US $0.57) and a larger amount a month later. To measure time consistency, we also asked
respondents to choose between 40 Ksh in 1 month and a larger amount in 2 months. The
risk preference questions were similar to Charness and Genicot (2009) and asked respondents
how much of 100 Ksh ($1.43) they would like to invest in an asset that paid oﬀ four times the
amount invested with probability 0.5 and that paid oﬀ 0 with probability 0.5.16 To measure
cognitive ability, we asked respondents to complete a “Raven’s Matrix” in which they had
to recognize patterns in a series of images.
Fourth, and most importantly, we collected detailed data on respondents through daily,
self-reported logbooks. These logbooks included detailed income, expenditure, and business
modules, as well as information on labor supply and on all transfers given and received
(including between spouses).
Because the logbooks were long and complicated to keep, trained enumerators met with
the respondents twice per week to verify that the logbooks were being ﬁlled correctly. One
signiﬁcant challenge was that many respondents could neither read nor write (33% of women
and 9% of men who agreed to keep the logbooks could not read nor write Swahili). To keep
these individuals in the sample, enumerators visited illiterate respondents every day to help
them ﬁll the logbook.
To keep data as comparable as possible, respondents kept logbooks during the same time
period in each wave, from mid-September to mid-December. Logbooks were kept in 2006 for
Wave 1, 2007 for Wave 2, and 2009 for Wave 3. To encourage participation, the logbooks
were collected every four weeks, and respondents were paid 50 Ksh ($0.71) for each week the
logbook was properly ﬁlled (as determined by the enumerator).17 Though respondents were
14We obtained consent from respondents to collect these records from the bank.
15This type of data was collected from all study participants in 2008. This means that, for respondents in
Waves 1 and 2, the data was collected after the treatment had been implemented, whereas for respondents
in Wave 3 it was collected at baseline. Since the treatment (getting a bank account) might have aﬀected risk
and time preferences among subjects, we do not make any strong conclusions regarding the heterogeneity of
the treatment eﬀect by these measures, but instead consider them as purely suggestive.
16To encourage truth-telling, one of the risk and time preference questions was randomly selected for
actual payment.
17This ﬁgure is equivalent to about one-third of daily total expenditures for respondents in this sample.
7asked to ﬁll the logbooks for up to 3 months, some were only willing to keep the logbooks
for a shorter period, and so we do not have 3 full months’ worth of data for all respondents.
The logbook data makes up the bulk of the analysis. For each respondent, we compute the
average daily business and household expenditures across all the days that the respondent
ﬁlled the logbook, and then compare these averages between the treatment and control
groups.
The logbooks included a module designed to estimate respondents’ investment, hours
worked and sales. From this, we planned to back out proﬁts. However, the imputed proﬁts
are ultimately unusable. This is because the quality of the data on revenues from the
business (mostly retail sales) is very poor. Many respondents did not keep good records of
their sales during the day, in part because they did not have time to record each small retail
transaction that they had. In contrast, the data on business investments (mostly wholesale
purchases) is relatively reliable, albeit somewhat noisy. As a result, total business revenues
are systematically smaller than total investment, and so total proﬁts are on average very
negative in the sample. What is problematic for us is that under-reporting of revenues
appears to increase with the size of the business (the more sales, the higher the share of
unrecorded sales). Given this, we estimate impacts on investment and revenues separately.18
2.7 Attrition
There were two main sources of attrition. The ﬁrst is that some respondents could not be
found and asked to keep the logbooks (because they had moved or could not otherwise be
traced). The second is that, as might be imagined from the length of the logbooks and the
relatively small compensation given to participants, some people refused to ﬁll the logbooks.
Of those who could be traced and oﬀered logbooks, 17% refused to ﬁll them (7% of women
and 21% of men).
We document attrition in Appendix Table A1. Among female vendors, we had more
diﬃculty tracing those in the treatment group, but acceptance to ﬁll the logbook was not
diﬀerential (conditional on being traced). But bodas, who were much more likely to attrit
than market women, attrited diﬀerentially: bodas in the treatment group were both more
likely to be found, and more likely to accept the logbooks if found, than those in the control
group. Male vendors were more likely to attrit from the treatment group. As we show in
the next section, the post-attrition treatment and control groups that make it into the ﬁnal
18While it is unfortunate that we do not have reliable proﬁt measures, we note that it is notoriously diﬃcult
to measure proﬁts for such small-scale entrepreneurs, especially since most do not keep records (Liedholm,
1991; Daniels, 2001). We did not ask respondents to report their proﬁt directly, which, in hindsight, appears
to have been a mistake: de Mel et al. (2009a) show that asking respondents to report proﬁts is more reliable
than trying to back out proﬁts from business transaction details.
8analysis do not diﬀer along most observable characteristics, but the diﬀerential attrition
patterns make it impossible to rule out unobservable diﬀerences between treatment and
control groups among bodas, who represent 80% of the men in our sample. While this
attrition limits conﬁdence in the results, it is unlikely that bodas could have beneﬁted from
the accounts since the amounts they deposited on their accounts were very modest(according
to the bank administrative records, which do not suﬀer from an attrition problem. See Figure
2.)
2.8 Final Sample Characteristics and Balance Check
Table 1 presents baseline characteristics of men and women that ﬁlled the logbooks by
treatment status, and the p-values of tests that the diﬀerences between treatment and control
are equal to zero.19 We have 250 logbooks in total, 170 of which were ﬁlled by market women
and 80 of which were ﬁlled by men (55 bicycle-taxi drivers and 25 market men).20 The
background variables are mostly self-explanatory, but we describe brieﬂy the time preference
measures. We deﬁne as “somewhat patient” any respondent who preferred 55 Ksh, or $0.79,
(or less) in 1 month to 40 Ksh ($0.57) today. For measures of time consistency, we assign
people to one of four categories: (1) “present-biased” respondents who are less patient in the
present than in the future; (2) respondents who exhibit maximum possible discount rates
in both the present and future (these individuals preferred 40 Ksh to 500 Ksh ($7.14) in
1 month, and 40 Ksh in 1 month to 500 Ksh in 2 months); (3) respondents who are more
patient in the present than in the future; and (4) “time-consistent” individuals who have the
same discount rate in the present and the future.
As can be seen in Table 1, around 21% of women and 5% of men were actually more
patient in the present than in the future. Though this seems counter-intuitive, previous
studies have found similar results: about 10% of respondents in Bauer, Chytilová, and
Morduch (2010) and 15% of respondents in Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) had preferences
of this type in studies in India and the Philippines, respectively.21
For both market women and men, the treatment and control groups are balanced along
19Standard errors of the diﬀerences are clustered at the individual level to account for the fact that Wave
1 control individuals appear twice (as controls in 2006 and treatment in 2007).
20We have fewer observations for the time preference, risk preference, and cognitive ability module. In
total, we have 220 observations for these variables.
21At the same time, many respondents in our Kenya sample were extremely impatient compared to the
samples in those two studies. This does not appear to be solely because people did not understand the
questions they were asked, or because they did not trust that payouts in the future would be delivered (if
chosen): in general, respondents showed similar levels of impatience in the future as in the present, even
though all payouts for the future questions would be delivered later (in 1 or 2 months, depending on the
answer to the question).
9most background characteristics. For women, the p-value of the diﬀerence between treatment
and control is above 0.10 for all 24 baseline characteristics presented in Table 1. These
ﬁgures suggest that attrition during the logbook exercise was not diﬀerential along observable
characteristics for market women, and performing the analysis on the restricted sample for
which we have data will not bias our estimates of the treatment eﬀect.22
There is more reason for concern among men. Four background characteristics have
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatment and control men (education, ROSCA
contributions, extreme impatience in both present and future, and an indicator for Wave 3),
and we know from Table A1 that there was diﬀerential attrition among bodas (which explains
the imbalance between groups in terms of occupation, see row 4). This diﬀerential attrition
means that there may well be unobservable diﬀerences between treatment and control bodas,
and thus our estimates of the treatment eﬀects on bodas may suﬀer from selection bias. On
the other hand, our estimates of the treatment on male vendors suﬀer from a tiny sample
size.
All in all, the sample of men for whom we have data has much lower validity (both
internally and externally) than our sample of market women. To deal with this issue, we
perform all our analyses with interaction terms between experimental treatment and type,
and we focus our attention on the results for market women.
Finally, a natural question is how representative these individuals are of the general
population in the area. Appendix Table A2 explores this, using data collected from a rep-
resentative sample of unbanked households in a nearby area for Dupas et al. (2012), as
well as representative samples of unbanked households in rural Uganda and rural Malawi
collected for ongoing projects. In column 1, we reproduce the summary statistics shown in
Table 1 for our study sample, combining women and men. In columns 2-4, we show the
summary statistics for the three other samples. Our respondents are somewhat younger,
more likely to be literate, more likely to participate in ROSCAs, and somewhat poorer in
terms of durable assets. They are indistinguishable in terms of risk preferences and access
to formal credit. Overall, while we acknowledge that our sample is selected, our respondents
seem to be relatively comparable to the average rural unbanked adult in East Africa.
22One potentially important diﬀerence is income (which is higher in treatment than control), particularly
since several of our key outcomes are proxies for post-treatment income. Note, however, that the standard
deviations of the baseline means are extremely large, and the diﬀerence is nowhere close to signiﬁcant. We
do not control for this variable in most speciﬁcations because the variable is missing for several respondents.
Including it as a control does not change the results, though we lose power due to the reduced sample size.
Results with alternative control choices are available upon request.
103 Results
3.1 Take-up
A total of 156 respondents had the opportunity to open a savings account through this
program. Twenty-one of them (13%) refused to open the account, while another 40% opened
an account but never made a single deposit. Figure 1 shows the histogram of the number of
transactions made by treatment individuals at the village bank within the ﬁrst 6 months of
being oﬀered the account. As can be seen, many individuals never used the account or only
used it rarely, though others used it regularly.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution functions of the total amount deposited in the
account in the ﬁrst 6 months, separately by gender. For readability, Panel A plots the CDFs
below the 75th percentile while Panel B plots the CDFs above the 75th percentile. The
distribution for men is clearly dominated by the distribution for women, especially at the
upper end of the distribution. While median deposits are actually 0 Ksh for both genders,
the 75th and 90th percentiles of total deposits are 350 Ksh ($5.00) and 1,200 Ksh ($17.14)
for men, but 725 Ksh ($10.35) and 5,650 Ksh ($80.71) for women.23 Mean deposits are more
than twice as high for women: they are 1,290 Ksh ($18.42) for men and 2,840 Ksh ($40.57)
for women.
3.2 Impact: Estimation Strategy
This section estimates the eﬀect of the savings account on average daily savings, business
investment, and expenditures. For each outcome, there are two level eﬀects of interest: the
intent-to-treat eﬀect (ITT), the average eﬀect of being assigned to the treatment group; and
the average eﬀect for those that actively used the account (the Treatment on the Treated or
ToT eﬀect).
We ﬁrst estimate the overall average eﬀect of being assigned to the treatment group (the
intent-to-treat eﬀect) on a given outcome Y using the following speciﬁcation:
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where Tit is an indicator which is equal to 1 if individual i had been assigned to the treatment
group (sampled for an account) in year t, Xi is a vector of baseline characteristics (including
gender and occupation), and yeark
it is a dummy equal to 1 if the logbook data was collected
in year k (2006, 2007 or 2009 in our data). Since the randomization was done after stratifying
23Formally, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of the two distributions returns a p-value of 0.12.
11by occupation, gender and wave/year, we follow Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and include
the strata dummies yeark
it, Mi×yeark
it, and Mi×Bi×yeark
it, where Mi is an indicator equal
to 1 for men and Bi is an indicator equal to 1 for bicycle-taxis (bodas).
We then add in interaction terms between the treatment and the occupation/gender cells:








it + ϑ2Mi × year
k
it + λ2Mi × Bi × year
k
it) + ε2it
where Vi is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is a male market vendor and, as above,
Bi is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is a boda (all of whom are males).
In this speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient β2 measures the average eﬀect of being assigned to the
treatment group for women; the sum β2 + γ2 measures the average eﬀect of being assigned
to the treatment group for male vendors, and the sum β2 + δ2 measures the average eﬀect
of being assigned to the treatment group for male bicycle-taxi drivers. Given the random
assignment to treatment, E(ε2it|Tit) = 0, and OLS estimates of β2,γ2, and δ2 will be unbiased
as long as attrition is not diﬀerential. As discussed earlier, since attrition was diﬀerential for
bodas, our estimates of δ2 may be biased.
Finally, we estimate the average eﬀect of actively using the account using an instrumen-
tal variable approach. Speciﬁcally, we instrument “actively using the account” with being
assigned to the treatment group:
Ait = a + bTit + cTit × Vi + dTit × Bi + X
0
iφ3 + ωit








it + ϑ3Mi × year
k
it + λ3Mi × Bi × year
k
it) + ε3it
where Ait is an indicator of whether individual i actively used the account in year t, which
we deﬁne as having made at least 2 deposits within 6 months. The very strong ﬁrst stage
for the IV estimation is presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 2.24 Overall, 41% of the
treatment group actively used the account.
In all the tables that follow, Panel A presents the ITT estimates, Panel B presents the
ToT estimates, and Panel C presents the means and standard deviations of the dependent
variables. For both the ITT and ToT estimates, and for each type of individuals in our
24In a previous version of this paper, we used a weaker deﬁnition for actively using the account (making
at least one deposit). We adopt a stronger approach here because it would be hard to beneﬁt from using
the account only once, unless simply having an account aﬀected an individual’s ability to refuse requests for
money (e.g., by pretending the money is in the bank and inaccessible, even if is not). In any case, IV results
look very similar with the weaker deﬁnition of actively using the account (results available upon request).
12sample, the p-value for the test that the treatment eﬀect is zero is provided at the bottom of
the panel. All regressions include the following baseline covariates: marital status, number
of children, age, literacy status, ROSCA contributions in the last year, the stratiﬁcation cells
(gender/ occupation /wave), and the share of days the log was ﬁlled in correctly.25
As might be expected, the data from the logbooks is relatively noisy. While most of our
main outcomes are not particularly sensitive to extreme values, business outcomes are. For
this reason, we present investment outcomes with and without trimming of the top 5% of
values.26
Finally, all the eﬀects for male vendors are very imprecisely estimated due to the very
limited size of that subgroup. The conﬁdence intervals for male vendors include both zero
and very large eﬀects, and to avoid putting unwarranted weight on these ﬁgures, we do not
show the coeﬃcient estimates for the interaction between treatment and male vendor (γ2
and γ3).
3.3 Impact on Savings
Table 2 presents the eﬀects of the account on savings. Columns 1-2 show the “ﬁrst stage”:
the impact of the treatment on being an “active” account user, where we deﬁne active as
having made at least two deposits onto the account within the ﬁrst 6 months of account
opening. Unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd very large ﬁrst stage eﬀects of the treatment assignment.
We then turn to total amounts saved. Columns 3-4 show results for savings in a bank
(as measured from the logbook), and the remaining columns measure whether bank savings
crowded out other types of savings (animals in Columns 5-6 and ROSCA contributions in
Columns 7-8).27
Reported average daily bank savings are signiﬁcantly higher in the treatment group
(column 3), but the treatment eﬀect is heterogeneous (column 4): there is an increase for
market women, but not for bodas. Market women who accessed an account did not decrease
their savings in animals or ROSCAs (if anything, they increased their animal stock), therefore
their total savings appear to have increased signiﬁcantly thanks to the treatment.
25The mean of this variable is 95.0%, with a standard deviation of 8.8%. Reassuringly, this variable does
not diﬀer between the treatment and the control groups.
26Noise in measures of business outcomes is a common issue in studies of small ﬁrms. See, for example,
de Mel et al., 2009a, 2009b and McKenzie and Woodruﬀ, 2008.
27Animal savings are measured as animal purchases less sales, and ROSCA contributions are measured
as contributions less payouts.
133.4 Impact on Business Outcomes
Table 3 presents estimates of the eﬀect of the accounts on labor supply and business out-
comes. Business investment for vendors is mostly in the form of inventory, but also includes
transportation costs associated with traveling to various market centers or shipping goods.
Investment for bicycle taxi drivers includes small improvements and repairs to their bicy-
cles.28
We ﬁnd no eﬀect of the account on labor supply, measured as the average number of
hours worked per day. However, we ﬁnd a large eﬀect of the account on the average daily
amount invested in the business, signiﬁcant at the 10% level. We ﬁnd that treated respon-
dents increase investment by 180 Ksh, on a base of just 300 Ksh, While the overall point
estimate is only of marginal signiﬁcance, it is extremely large (equivalent to a 60% increase
in investment). Given that many people in the treatment group did not use the account, the
IV estimate of the eﬀect on active users is even larger (425 Ksh, or over a 100% increase). As
with the eﬀect on overall savings, this eﬀect is concentrated among market women, though
the treatment eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels for them alone (due
to the smaller sample size in that group).
Columns 5 and 6 show the results when the business investment data is trimmed. Trim-
ming of course lowers the mean of the dependent variable. It also attenuates the treatment
eﬀect, suggesting that most of the very large values are in the treatment group (as would be
expected). Even this conservative estimate shows a very large eﬀect for market women: the
average daily investment of female vendors in the treatment group is 90 Ksh ($1.28) higher
than that of female vendors in the control group (with a p-value of 0.14). Given the baseline
average of 240 Ksh ($3.43) in the control group, this eﬀect is equivalent to a 37.5% increase
in investment. Again, the IV estimate is extremely large.
Overall, these results suggest that the treatment had a substantial eﬀect on market
women’s ability to invest in their business. This is especially noteworthy given that only a
minority of women used the accounts – the eﬀect for those that actually used the accounts
is extremely large. Thus, while it is important to further investigate these results in future
work with bigger samples and more precise estimates, our results suggest potentially very
large eﬀects on business outcomes.
Interestingly, this increase in investment for women does not appear to come from a
change in business type: we see no change in the category of items traded by women in the
treatment group. We also did not observe a change in the scale (retail vs. wholesale) of
businesses among women in the treatment group. This means that the market women who
28All bodas in our sample already owned their bike at baseline.
14beneﬁted from the account simply purchased more from the wholesaler.
We also ﬁnd an increase in revenues among market women (columns 7-10), but as dis-
cussed above, the amounts reported as revenues are typically smaller than the amounts
reported for investments, and all in all taking the diﬀerence between the treatment impacts
on revenues and investments would suggest that the treatment reduced proﬁts for market
women. We do not consider this as likely. Rather, it seems that revenues were systematically
under-reported and this under-reporting was magniﬁed in the treatment group.
3.5 Impact on Expenditures and Transfers
Table 4 presents estimates of the impact on the average expenditures reported in the log-
books. The ﬁrst six columns present total, food, and private expenditures (private expendi-
tures include meals in restaurants, sodas, alcohol, cigarettes, own clothing, hairstyling, and
entertainment expenses).
We ﬁnd a positive overall treatment eﬀect. The point estimate for total expenditures is
positive, though the p-value is only 0.13. More disaggregated expenditure categories reveal
large increases for some items. Across the whole sample, food expenditures increased by 13%
while private expenditures increased by 38%. These imply even larger eﬀects for account
users (of 32% and 93%, respectively).29 As in the previous tables, these eﬀects are driven by
market women.
The last four columns of Table 4 look at the impacts on transfers to and from others.
Transfers include both cash and in-kind transfers of goods and services (as valued by the
respondent). We look at net transfers to individuals outside the household and net transfers
to the spouse (for married/cohabiting respondents). The point estimates suggest a decrease
in net transfers outside the household and no eﬀect on inter-spousal transfers, but the results
are very imprecise, with large standard errors, and even for inter-household transfers we
cannot reject the null of zero eﬀect.
3.6 Robustness Checks
There are several possible threats to the internal validity of this study. In the Appendix, we
consider two potentially important concerns: (1) that the results might be driven by people
who were anticipating a later loan from the village bank, and (2) that the results might be
driven by people making large deposits (who presumably do not have a problem saving in
29The returns to capital would have to be implausibly large for this increase in expenditure to be entirely
due to an increase in business income. Given this, the increase in expenditure likely comes from both an
increase in income and an increase in the ability to shield income from others.
15the ﬁrst place since they deposit so much at any one time). We ﬁnd no evidence for either
of these alternatives, and so we feel conﬁdent that our main results reﬂect the impact of
savings services alone for people who otherwise ﬁnd it hard to save as much as they would
like.
4 Discussion of Potential Mechanisms
Overall, our results show that the informal savings mechanisms available in rural Kenya are
ineﬀective in allowing a sizeable fraction of market women to save (and subsequently invest)
as much as they would like. These results raise two questions: First, why do market women
need a savings account when it seems like they could instead simply reinvest immediately in
their business – why do they put money into the savings account at all? Second, why is the
private return to informal savings so highly negative for a large fraction of the market women
in our sample? Since our data does not enable us to conclusively answer these questions, we
instead use this section to make some conjectures as to possible answers and areas to further
investigate.
With regards to the ﬁrst question, we see three possible reasons why business owners
may have to save at home or in a bank account, even if the returns are negative, rather
than continuously reinvest in their business. The ﬁrst is that investment may be lumpy, so
that entrepreneurs cannot reinvest in their business until they have saved up for the next
discrete unit. Instead, they must save outside of the business for some time before they
can reinvest.30 The second is that business proﬁts may be variable, but at least partially
foreseeable by entrepreneurs, so that there are periods in which it is optimal to save money
outside the business. The third is that it might not be possible to quickly and costlessly
liquidate working capital if a shock were to occur. If people face credit constraints, the
liquidity costs of holding capital uniquely in the business might make it necessary for people
to save against unanticipated shocks (such as illness) outside the business.
With regards to the second question, we see two broad explanations for why market
women in our sample could not save enough without formal savings devices. First, these
women may have present-biased preferences, and thus may be tempted to spend any cash
money that they hold (Laibson, 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Gul and Pesendorfer,
2004). Second, these women may face regular demands on their income from relatives or
30For this channel to be at play, deposits have to be smaller than the investment “lump”. To check this,
Figure 3 plots a CDF of average deposits, withdrawals, and investment (excluding zeros) for market women
in our sample. Average deposits are clearly dominated by investment (and investment is dominated by
withdrawals). This suggests that market women in our sample saved up relatively small amounts to deposit,
and then withdrew in bigger sums.
16neighbors (Platteau, 2000), or from their husbands (Ashraf, 2009). In either case, keeping
money at the bank where it is not immediately accessible might increase total savings.
Both phenomena have been shown to be at play in our study area. Duﬂo, Kremer
and Robinson (2011) show that time-inconsistent preferences limit proﬁtable investments
in fertilizer by farmers in Western Kenya. Also in Western Kenya, Dupas and Robinson
(2012) show that money demands from others form an important barrier to preventative
health investments. However, the eﬀectiveness of a savings product in overcoming these two
barriers depends on the type of commitment or earmarking it provides. In Dupas and Robin-
son (2012), we show that, while pressure to share with others can be somewhat overcome
with a simple savings technology such as a box with a lock and key, overcoming time-
inconsistent preferences requires a savings technology with a strong commitment feature,
such as a ROSCA.
Which of these two barriers mattered in our sample? The way accounts were used provide
some insights. The frequency of transactions was relatively low, and the median deposit size
was relatively large (the average deposit size for the median woman who actively used the
account was equivalent to about 1.6 days of average expenditures.) This, combined with the
fact that the bank closed at 3pm (well before work ends for most market vendors), makes it
clear that market women did not build up savings balances by depositing small amounts of
money every night after work, but instead saved up for some time and then deposited larger
sums. This suggests that the basic savings accounts provided in the study were not likely
to be useful to solve a hyperbolic discounting problem. Rather, market women may have
been using the accounts to protect their income from demands from friends and family. For
instance, women may get asked for money by extended family and may feel socially obligated
to give something if the money is readily accessible, but these requests might be relatively
infrequent (every few weeks, for example). If so, and if it is costly (in terms of time and
eﬀort) to go to the bank, it may be rational to only go to the bank every few weeks, rather
than every day.31
To provide further evidence on potential mechanisms, Table 5 looks at determinants of
account usage. We restrict the sample to those ever oﬀered an account, and regress the log
31In qualitative surveys, people report that it is easier to say “no” to friends and relatives asking for money
when the money is saved in a bank than when money is saved in the house. This suggests that generosity
towards friends and relatives might often be “involuntary” – people give money to avoid having to lie about
money availability (to avoid a feeling of guilt) but if the money is truly not available at home, people do
not feel guilty saying they have no money available. This is consistent with lab experiments showing that,
in dictator games, dictators are willing to sacriﬁce part of the total prize to opt out of the game, provided
that the decision is not revealed to recipients (Dana, Cain and Dawes, 2006). This opting-out behavior is
particularly common among dictators who appear “generous” when the silent opt-out option is not available
(Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson, 2007), suggesting that guilt or shame, rather than altruism, is at the
source of the high generosity levels typically observed in dictator games.
17of the sum of total deposits in the ﬁrst six months on baseline characteristics. To include
those who made no deposits, we add one to the sum of total deposits, such that for those
who made zero deposit the dependent variable is zero. The coeﬃcients on female vendor
is large and signiﬁcant (relative to the omitted category – bodas),32 but its magnitude (and
even sign) change as covariates are added, suggesting that the female vendor eﬀect can
be explained by observable characteristics. In particular, usage is very strongly positively
correlated with ROSCA participation, which is higher among female vendors.33 Account
usage is also very strongly correlated with wealth (measured in the value of animals and
durable goods owned), suggesting that the accounts were mostly useful for people somewhat
further above subsistence.
We include controls for risk and time preferences in Column 3 of Table 5.34 Risk aversion
is correlated with usage: less risk-averse individuals were less likely to use the accounts,
pointing to a possible consumption smoothing rationale for usage. More patient people ap-
pear more likely to save, although the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. In terms of the time consistency
measures, we ﬁnd that respondents who exhibit present-biased preferences were not more
likely to deposit money than the omitted time-consistent group. This is not surprising since
the savings account we subsidized oﬀered a commitment device to avoid spending money
once it had been deposited, but was not accompanied by a commitment to make regular
deposits. Present-biased individuals might have had a diﬃcult time committing themselves
to making regular trips to the bank.
32Note that a dummy for male vendor is included in this regression but the coeﬃcient is not shown.
33Given the correlation between ROSCA participation and active use of the account, the fact that ROSCA
contributions among market women were not crowded out by the accounts (Table 2) could be surprising,
especially since savings are more quickly and reliably accessible when placed in a formal account than with
a ROSCA. We can think of various possible explanations for why this is the case, however. First of all,
ROSCA cycles can be long (up to 18 months), so our data might be too medium-run to capture changes in
participation. Secondly, ROSCAs typically oﬀer more than just savings to their participants. In particular,
many ROSCAs oﬀer loans (in addition to the regular pot) to their participants, and often also provide some
emergency insurance. A census of ROSCAs we conducted in the area of study suggests that 64% of ROSCAs
oﬀer loans to their members, and 54% oﬀer insurance in case of a funeral or other catastrophic events (Dupas
and Robinson, 2012). Finally, while bank savings are made individually, ROSCA contributions are made
in a group. The social aspect of ROSCAs may provide some form of commitment, either through social
pressure to keep contributing (Gugerty, 2007) or from the regular schedule of payments. For these reasons,
a formal savings account might only be an imperfect substitute for ROSCA participation.
34As discussed earlier, note that these measures should be taken with some caution as they were measured
ex-post for a large part of the sample.
185 Conclusion
The experiment described in this paper provides strong evidence that a sizeable fraction of
micro-entrepreneurs in rural Kenya face major savings constraints. These constraints are so
strong that around 40% of market women decided to take up savings accounts which oﬀered
a negative real interest rate. This result suggests that the alternative savings opportunities
that market women face oﬀer an expected return even more negative.
Market women use these accounts to save up to increase the size of their business and
increase their private expenditures. However, the accounts had minimal eﬀects for the other
group of daily income earners in our sample (bicycle-taxi drivers), who did not use the
accounts at all. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that these men were able to save at
home more securely, and so did not need accounts with such low returns. However, we prefer
not to draw any conclusions regarding that subgroup, because there was diﬀerential attrition
between the treatment and control arms among them, and we cannot rule out that there
were diﬀerences in unobservable characteristics between the two arms.
Given the large impacts we estimate for at least a third of the market women in our
sample, a natural question is why market women did not open up accounts on their own,
prior to our study. This seems to be because the bank we worked with (the only bank
in town) was relatively new and poorly known at baseline. This is consistent with recent
evidence that levels of familiarity with and trust in ﬁnancial institutions are relatively low in
rural Kenya, due to a long history of ﬁnancial scandals of various sorts, as well as unreliable
service provision (Dupas et al., 2012). The bank we partnered with was reliable, however,
and therefore take-up of accounts should have increased over time. Indeed, the number of
account holders at the bank increased by 200% between 2007 and 2011, from around 1,300
to 4,000.
Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that extending basic banking services could have large eﬀects
at relatively small cost, especially relative to credit alone. However, there are several major
caveats to this result. The most important is that our sample is relatively small and composed
entirely of two speciﬁc types of income earners, so more work needs to be done to examine
whether the results generalize to other individuals in other settings.
Another important caveat is that while we document savings constraints at the individual
level, the general equilibrium eﬀects of extending savings to the entire unbanked population
remain unclear. It is possible that the market women in our treatment group grew their
business at the expense of neighboring businesses. Even beyond this, the accounts could
have changed the nature of informal insurance networks. For example, if informal insurance
is constrained by a limited commitment constraint, the accounts could have changed par-
19ticipation in informal insurance by aﬀecting the value of autarky for treatment individuals
(Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2000). To estimate such general equilibrium eﬀects, one would
have to randomize access to ﬁnancial services at the village level (rather than the individual
level), or to exploit gradual expansion of formal saving services across villages (which is
diﬃcult since bank expansion typically brings both saving and credit services at the same
time, as in Burgess and Pande, 2005, or Bruhn and Love, 2009). This is outside the scope of
this study, which aimed to ﬁrst establish the extent to which saving constraints are binding
at the individual level, but we believe that studying the importance of savings constraints
at a more aggregate level is an important issue for future work.
Our ﬁndings also raise a number of issues about the pathways through which formal bank
accounts helped market women in our sample. First, are the savings constraints implied by
our results due primarily to social pressure to share resources, or to self-control problems?
Second, to what extent do intra-household (inter-spousal) conﬂicts in preferences explain
our results?
Finally, a particularly important question is why more than half of the individuals in the
treatment group did not actively take up these accounts. Is it because they do not have
savings problems, or is it because this particular saving device was not well suited to their
needs, for example because it did not oﬀer a strong commitment feature? One clue is that
92% of those that were oﬀered accounts but who did not actively use them report that “it
is hard to save at home,” which suggests that they, too, face barriers to savings. Given
the dearth of savings and credit opportunities currently available in sub-Saharan Africa,
more work is needed to understand which saving services or devices are best suited to these
individuals.
20References
[1] Aggarwal, Shilpa, Leora Klapper and Dorothe Singer (2011). “Financing Businesses in
Africa: The Role of Microﬁnance.” Working paper, World Bank.
[2] Aportela, Fernando (1999): “Eﬀects of Financial Access on Savings by Low-Income
People.” mimeo, Banco de México.
[3] Ashraf, Nava (2009): “Spousal Control and Intra-Household Decision Making: An Ex-
perimental Study in the Philippines.” American Economic Review 99(4): 1245-1277.
[4] Ashraf, Nava, Dean S. Karlan and Wesley Yin (2006): “Tying Odysseus to the Mast:
Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines.” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 121(2): 635-672.
[5] Attanasio, Orazio, Britta Augsburg, Ralph De Haas, Emla Fitzsimons and Heike Har-
mgart (2012). “Group Lending versus Individual Lending in Mongolia.” Working
paper.
[6] Banerjee, Abhijit, Duﬂo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan (2009): “The
Miracle of Microﬁnance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation.” mimeo, MIT.
[7] Bauer, Michal, Julie Chytilová, and Jonathan Morduch (2010): “Behavioral Founda-
tions of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence.” IZA Discussion Paper No.
4901.
[8] Broberg, T., T. Ellingsen, and M. Johannesson (2007): “Is Generosity Involuntary?”
Economic Letters, 94, 32–37.
[9] Bruhn, Miriam, and David McKenzie (2009): “In the Pursuit of Balance: Randomiza-
tion in Practice in Development Field Experiments”. American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics 1(4): 200–232.
[10] Bruhn, Miriam, and Inessa Love (2009): “The economic impact of banking the un-
banked: evidence from Mexico”. World Bank Policy Research working paper no.
4981.
[11] Burgess, Robin and Rohini Pande (2005): “Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the
Indian Social Banking Experiment.” American Economic Review 95 (3): 780-795.
[12] Chaia, Alberto, Aparna Dalal, Tony Goland, Maria Jose Gonzalez, Jonathan Morduch,
and Robert Schi (2009). “Half the World is Unbanked.” Financial Access Initiative
Framing Note.
[13] Charness, Gary and Garance Genicot (2009): “Informal Risk Sharing in an Inﬁnite-
Horizon Experiment.” Economic Journal 119 (537): 796-825.
21[14] Cole, Shawn A., Thomas Sampson, and Bilal Zia (2011). “Prices or Knowledge? What
Drives Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets?” Journal of Finance 66
(6): 1933 - 1967.
[15] Collins, Darryl, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford, and Orlando Ruthven (2009).
Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on Two Dollars a Day. Princeton
University Press.
[16] Crépon, Bruno, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duﬂo and William Parienté (2011). “Impact
of Microcredit in Rural Areas of Morocco: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation.”
Mimeo, MIT.
[17] Dana, J., D. M. Cain, and R. M. Dawes (2006): “What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Me:
Costly (But Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games,” Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 100, 193–201.
[18] Daniels, Lisa (2001): “Testing Alternative Measures of Microenterprise Proﬁts and Net
Worth.” Journal of International Development 13: 599-614.
[19] de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruﬀ (2008): “Returns to Cap-
ital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123(4): 1329-1372.
[20] de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruﬀ (2009a): “Measuring Mi-
croenterprise Proﬁts: Must We Ask How the Sausage Is Made?” Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 88(1): 19-31.
[21] de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruﬀ (2009b): “Are Women
More Credit Constrained? Experimental Evidence on Gender and Microenterprise
Returns” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1(3): 1-32.
[22] de Soto, Hernando (1989). The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World,
New York, NY: Harper and Row.
[23] Duﬂo, Esther, Michael Kremer and Jonathan Robinson (2011). “Nudging Farmers to
Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya.” American Economic
Review 101 (6): 2350-2390.
[24] Dupas, Pascaline, and Jonathan Robinson (2012).“Why don’t the Poor Save More?
Evidence from Health Savings Experiments in Kenya”. Mimeo, UCLA.
[25] Dupas, Pascaline, Sarah Green, Anthony Keats, and Jonathan Robinson (2012). “Sup-
ply and Demand Challenges in Banking the Rural Poor: Evidence from Kenya.”
Forthcoming, NBER Africa Project Conference Volume.
22[26] Gugerty, Mary Kay (2007): “You can’t save alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings
and Credit Associations in Kenya”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 55:
251-282.
[27] Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2001), “Temptation and Self-Control”, Econo-
metrica 69(6): 1403-1435.
[28] Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2004): “Self-Control and the Theory of Con-
sumption,” Econometrica 72(1): 119-158.
[29] International Monetary Fund (2010): World Economic Outlook Database. Available
online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx.
[30] Johnston, Don Jr. and Jonathan Morduch (2008): “The Unbanked: Evidence from
Indonesia,” World Bank Economic Review 22 (3): 517-537.
[31] Kaboski, Joseph and Robert Townsend (2005): “Policies and Impact: An Analysis of
Village-Level Microﬁnance Institutions,” Journal of the European Economic Associ-
ation 3(1): 1-50.
[32] Kaboski, Joseph and Robert Townsend (2011): “A Structural Evaluation of a Large-
Scale Quasi-Experimental Microﬁnance Initiative.” Econometrica 79 (5): 1357-1406.
[33] Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman (2010a): “Expanding Credit Access: Using Ran-
domized Supply Decisions To Estimate the Impacts” Review of Financial Studies
23(1): 433-46.
[34] Karlan, Dean and Jonathan Zinman (2010b): “Expanding Microenterprise Credit Ac-
cess: Using Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts in Manila.”
mimeo, Dartmouth and Yale.
[35] Kendall, Jake, Nataliya Mylenko and Alejandro Ponce (2010). “Measuring Financial
Access around the World.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5253.
[36] Laibson, David (1997): “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112(2): 443-477.
[37] Liedholm, Carl (1991): “Data Collection Strategies for Small-scale Industry Surveys”,
GEMINI Working Paper No. 11, Bethesda, MD: Development Alternatives, Inc.
[38] Ligon, Ethan, Jonathan P. Thomas, and Tim Worrall (2000): “Mutual Insurance, In-
dividual Savings, and Limited Commitment,” Review of Economic Dynamics 3 (2):
216-246.
[39] McKenzie, David and Christopher Woodruﬀ (2008): “Experimental Evidence on Re-
turns to Capital and Access to Finance in Mexico.” World Bank Economic Review
2322(3): 457-482.
[40] Platteau, Jean-Philippe (2000): “Egalitarian Norms and Economic Growth.” In
Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development. Amsterdam, Harwood Aca-
demic Publishers.
[41] Rutherford, Stuart (2000): The Poor and Their Money. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
[42] Thaler, Richard H. and Shlomo Benartzi (2004): “Save More Tomorrow: Using Behav-
ioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving,” Journal of Political Economy 112(1):
S164-187.
[43] Strauss, John and Duncan Thomas (1995): “Human Resources: Empirical Modeling of
Household and Family Decisions”, in J. Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook
of Development Economics, volume 3A, chapter 34, 1883-2023. Amsterdam: North-
Holland Press.
[44] World Bank (2004): World Bank Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Cli-
mate – for Everyone, New York, NY: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
24Notes: Data from 156 individuals offered an account. Those who refused to open an account are coded as having 0 
transactions (Figure 1) and 0 deposits (Figure 2). The sample mean of the total deposited in the first six months is 2,500 Ksh. 
The mean among those with a non-zero total is 5,000 Ksh (median: 700 Ksh).
Figure 1. Number of transactions at village bank in first 6 months
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Panel B: CDF of Deposits in First 6 Months, Above 75th Percentile
25Figure 3. CDFs of Deposits, Withdrawals, and Investment (in Ksh) for Female Vendors
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26Table 1. Sample Characteristics and Balance Check
















Wave 1 0.17 0.14 0.57 0.36 0.51 0.17
Wave 2 0.31 0.32 0.87 0.54 0.49 0.66
Wave 3 0.52 0.54 0.80 0.10 0.00 0.04**
Occupation: Boda  0.00 0.00 - 0.62 0.76 0.18
Demographics
Age 34.40 36.43 0.22 30.10 30.63 0.79
(11.43) (10.14) (8.45) (8.96)
Married 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.80 0.83 0.70
Number of Children 3.57 3.53 0.89 2.69 2.90 0.68
(2.18) (2.20) (2.19) (2.34)
Education 5.95 5.77 0.74 6.56 8.07 0.01***
(3.02) (3.73) (2.57) (2.44)
Literate (Swahili) 0.70 0.61 0.23 0.90 0.95 0.37
Participates in ROSCA 0.88 0.89 0.73 0.41 0.46 0.64
ROSCA Contributions in Last Year (in Ksh) 4216 5244 0.25 1172 2524 0.07*
(4424) (6674) (2196) (4123)
Value of Animals Owned (in Ksh) 4556 4791 0.87 4149 6265 0.35
(9241) (8864) (5660) (12685)
Value of Durable Goods Owned (in Ksh) 4100 3355 0.61 8415 6788 0.55
(12065) (6385) (11931) (11750)
Total Income in Week Prior to Survey (in Ksh) 1116 1233 0.73 564 670 0.42
(1285) (1563) (464) (634)
Received Loan from Bank in Past Year 0.04 0.06 0.76 0.03 0.03 0.93
Received Loan from Friend in Past Year 0.39 0.44 0.66 0.34 0.41 0.56
Self-Reported Health Status
1 3.37 3.29 0.70 3.54 3.56 0.93
(0.88) (0.84) (0.82) (0.90)
Agrees with statement: "It is hard to save at home" 0.88 0.90 0.75 0.89 0.77 0.23
Risk and Time Preferences
2
Amount invested (out of 100 Ksh) in Risky Asset 64.40 63.57 0.81 60.65 66.13 0.32
(21.20) (21.74) (24.21) (18.56)
Somewhat Patient 0.10 0.09 0.78 0.16 0.19 0.75
Time-consistent 0.20 0.20 0.97 0.30 0.36 0.66
Present-biased 0.23 0.21 0.88 0.27 0.39 0.32
More Patient in Future than in Present 0.18 0.26 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.58
Maximal Discount Rate in Present and in Future 0.39 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.19 0.08*
Cognitive Skills
Raven's matrix score (percent correct) 0.47 0.48 0.82 0.52 0.49 0.68
Observations 96 74 170 39 41 80
Female Vendors Males (Vendors and Bodas)
Notes: Sample restricted to respondents for whom we have logbook data. Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 report means, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. Columns 3 and 6 report p-values obtained when testing the hypothesis that the difference between the treatment and the 
control means is equal to 0. P-values under 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 are highlighted with *,**,*** respectively. Exchange rate was roughly 70 Ksh to 
US $1 during the study period. 
1Health Status is coded as: 1-very poor, 2-poor, 3-just OK, 4-good, 5-very good.
2The risky asset paid off 4 times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5. "Somewhat Patient" is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the respondent prefers 55 Ksh (or less) in a month to 40 Ksh now. "Time Consistent" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent 
exhibits the same discount rate between today and 1 month from today. "Present-Biased" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits 
a higher discount rate between today and one month from today than between 1 month from today and two months from today, "More 
Patient in Future than in Present" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is more patient in 1 month than she is today, and "Maximum 
Discount Rate in the Present and in the Future" is a dummy equal to 1 if a respondent prefers 40 Ksh today to 500 Ksh in 1 month and 40 
Ksh in 1 month to 500 Ksh in 2 months.  27Table 2. Impacts on Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Estimates (ITT)
Sampled for Savings Account 0.41 0.40 9.36 11.39 16.79 23.26 7.81 12.57
(0.05)*** (0.06)*** (3.43)*** (4.42)** (10.05)* (14.03)* (7.02) (10.08)
Sampled for Savings Account * Boda 0.06 -12.43 -20.00 -12.56
(0.11) (6.06)** (17.85) (14.10)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.1* 0.27
p-value for effect for female vendors = 0 0.01*** 0.01** 0.1* 0.21
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.01*** 0.82 0.75 1.00
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimates (ToT)
Account is Active 22.82 28.77 40.91 58.37 19.03 31.42
(8.51)*** (11.41)** (24.41)* (35.09)* (17.08) (25.11)
Account is Active * Boda -29.35 -49.40 -30.57
(13.88)** (40.88) (31.87)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.01*** 0.1* 0.27
p-value for effect for female vendors = 0 0.01** 0.1* 0.21
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.95 0.67 0.96
Panel C. Mean and Std. Dev. of Dependent Variable in Control Group
Entire Sample:      Mean -1.95 3.81 26.30
                             Std. Dev. 30.29 9.16 35.46
Female Vendors:   Mean -2.33 3.58 33.27
                             Std. Dev. 33.78 9.13 38.76
Bodas:                   Mean 3.96 3.66 5.07
                             Std. Dev. 16.61 9.01 7.25
Exchange rate was roughly 70 Ksh to US $1 during the study period.
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: Dependent variables are daily averages. Dependent variables expressed in Kenyan shillings. Controls include occupation, ROSCA contributions in 
year before baseline, marital status, number of children, age, literacy,  the number of weeks in the diary data, and the wave / type stratification cells. Even-
numbered colums also include an interaction term between "Sampled for Savings Account"  and "Male Vendor". The first-stage for the IV estimations in 
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28Table 3. Impacts on Business Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Estimates (ITT)
Sampled for Savings Account 0.15 0.31 179.71 203.23 87.37 90.43 129.32 116.46 58.59 37.59
(0.37) (0.44) (105.17)* (147.63) (46.91)* (61.38) (100.32) (133.34) (34.83)* (43.62)
Sampled for Savings Account * Boda -0.58 -97.03 -30.08 -3.28 27.70
(0.88) (222.92) (84.45) (203.17) (76.40)
Observations 249 249 244 244 244 244 241 241 241 241
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.69 0.09* 0.06* 0.20 0.09*
p-value for effect for female vendors = 0 0.49 0.17 0.14 0.38 0.39
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.72 0.50 0.34 0.46 0.30
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimates (ToT)
Account is Active 0.36 0.77 425.20 503.85 206.72 224.49 304.44 289.71 137.93 94.20
(0.91) (1.12) (248.32)* (365.57) (112.18)* (154.02) (236.81) (331.59) (83.02)* (109.20)
Account is Active * Boda -1.31 -258.45 -86.73 -41.68 47.25
(1.94) (490.29) (187.01) (438.13) (162.00)
Observations 249 249 244 244 244 244 241 241 241 241
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.69 0.09* 0.07* 0.20 0.10
p-value for effect for female vendors = 0 0.49 0.17 0.15 0.38 0.39
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.74 0.44 0.28 0.41 0.25
Panel C. Mean and Std. Dev. of Dependent Variable in Control Group
Entire Sample:      Mean 6.09 296.83 191.08 343.89 197.26
                             Std. Dev. 2.96 487.83 224.20 518.63 186.23
Female Vendors:   Mean 5.78 363.84 239.80 403.43 226.40
                             Std. Dev. 3.02 471.69 222.03 560.85 205.26
Bodas:                   Mean 7.25 11.30 11.30 96.68 96.68
                             Std. Dev. 2.68 8.81 8.81 48.04 48.04








Business Revenues  
(Top 5% Trimmed)
29Table 4. Impacts on Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Estimates (ITT)
Sampled for Savings Account 23.93 31.17 10.67 14.46 8.94 7.77 -12.85 -18.84 3.45 4.16
(15.81) (19.59) (6.41)* (8.47)* (3.75)** (3.98)* (14.40) (20.86) (5.23) (7.06)
Sampled for Savings Account * Boda -9.70 -7.78 5.18 17.81 4.01
(44.42) (15.61) (11.63) (22.65) (9.71)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 249 249 202 202
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.13 0.1* 0.02** 0.37 0.51
p-value for effect for female vendors = 0 0.11 0.09* 0.05* 0.37 0.56
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.58 0.60 0.24 0.86 0.20
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimates (ToT)
Account is Active 58.33 77.97 26.00 36.20 21.79 19.61 -31.37 -47.32 9.07 11.50
(38.50) (48.81) (15.46)* (21.02)* (9.40)** (10.18)* (35.40) (53.01) (13.59) (19.48)
Account is Active * Boda -30.73 -21.09 8.62 43.53 4.69
(96.51) (33.92) (26.12) (54.54) (23.65)
Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250 249 249 202 202
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.13 0.09* 0.02** 0.38 0.51
p-value for effect for female vendors = 0 0.11 0.09* 0.06* 0.37 0.56
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.56 0.57 0.25 0.75 0.22
Panel C. Mean and Std. Dev. of Dependent Variable in Control Group
Entire Sample:      Mean 163.12 82.04 23.33 6.96 -9.02
                             Std. Dev. 119.69 53.87 23.39 192.44 42.83
Female Vendors:   Mean 169.14 86.96 21.08 12.03 -26.44
                             Std. Dev. 117.77 54.96 23.44 228.14 35.68
Bodas:                   Mean 131.21 59.24 25.12 -0.23 21.50
                             Std. Dev. 106.84 31.43 23.77 10.53 18.96
Notes: see Table 2 notes. 
Daily Total Expenditure Daily Food Expenditure
Daily Private 
Expenditure
Net Transfers Outside 
the Household
Net Transfers to Spouse
30(1) (2) (3)
Background Characteristics
Female Vendor 1.828 -0.805 -0.190
(0.788)** (2.027) (2.042)
Years of Education -0.033 -0.082
(0.121) (0.124)






Female Vendor * Married 1.675 0.694
(2.133) (2.159)
Value of ROSCA Contributions in Year Prior to Baseline 0.140 0.162
     (in 1,000 Ksh) (0.051)*** (0.053)***
Value of Animals Owned (in 1,000 Ksh) 0.077 0.063
(0.031)** (0.032)**
Value of Durable Goods Owned (in 1,000 Ksh) 0.103 0.130
(0.046)** (0.047)***
Risk Aversion
Amount invested (out of 100 Ksh) in Risky Asset -1.788







Observations 156 149 149
R-squared 0.08 0.25 0.31
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.090 3.156 3.156
Log (1+ Total Deposited in Ksh)
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the sum (in Kenyan shillings) of all deposits made within six 
months of account opening plus one (to include those who did not make any deposits). Sample 
restricted to respondents sampled for an account, and for whom we have logbook data. The risk 
aversion and time discounting questions are missing for 33 respondents, so we include them by 
assigning them a value of 0 and including a dummy for missing that question. See the notes to Table 1 
for definitions of risk and time preferences variables. The excluded time consistency category is "Time 
Consistent". The regression includes dummies (not shown) for other time consistency categories. See 
Figure 1 for a histogram of total transactions. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 5. Determinants of Account Usage within 6 months of Account Opening
31Table A1. Sampling Frame









Panel A. Sample Frame: Total number of people interviewed at baseline
TOTAL 262 96 34 392
Assigned to Control 132 48 17 197
Assigned to Treatment 130 48 17 195
Wave 1 46 64 0 110
Assigned to Control 23 32 55
Assigned to Treatment 23 32 55
Wave 2 65 32 23 120
Assigned to Control 33 16 12 61
Assigned to Treatment 32 16 11 59
Wave 3 151 0 11 162
Assigned to Control 76 5 81
Assigned to Treatment 75 6 81
Panel B. Number of people still in the sample at the time the Logbooks were introduced
TOTAL 200 74 27 301
Control 111 34 17 162
Treatment 89 40 10 139
Wave 1 32 43 0 75
Control 16 18 34
Treatment 16 25 41
Wave 2 65 31 22 118
Control 33 16 12 61
Treatment 32 15 10 57
Wave 3 103 0 5 108
Control 62 5 67
Treatment 41 0 41
Panel C. Study Sample: Total number of people that completed Logbooks
TOTAL 170 55 25 250
Control 96 24 15 135
Treatment 74 31 10 115
Wave 1 26 35 0 61
Control 16 14 30
Treatment 10 21 31
Wave 2 54 20 21 95
Control 30 10 11 51
Treatment 24 10 10 44
Wave 3 90 0 4 94
Control 50 4 54
Treatment 40 0 40
Panel D. Compliance with Treatment among those assigned to Treatment Group
Total that could not be traced for account offer 26 8 5 39
Total offered account 104 40 12 156
Total that refused account offer 15 4 2 21
Total that opened account 89 36 10 135
Notes: Attrition from the sample between the baseline and the introduction of the logbook (the drop from Panel A to Panel B) was due to 
relocation of respondents outside of the study area. This type of attrition was higher for wave 3 and wave 1 than wave 2, because the gap 
between baseline and the rollout of the logbook was much longer (14 months on average for wave 3 and 9 months for wave 1) compared to 
wave 2 (5 months). Attrition in the Logbook sample (the drops from Panel B to Panel C) was due to refusals.
32Table A2. Comparison between study sample and representative samples of unbanked households in rural East Africa




Census of unbanked 
households in 3 
villages
Central Uganda:
Unbanked Households in 
19 Parishes
Southern Malawi:







Age 33.71 40.15 36.29 39.55
(10.48) (16.72) (12.00) (19.07)
Married 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.73
Number of Children 3.31 3.35 5.05 2.67
(2.23) (2.34) (3.04) (1.74)
Education 6.34 5.95 5.50 5.60
(3.19) (3.38) (2.97) (2.91)
Literate 0.74 0.51 0.76 0.61
Participates in ROSCA 0.74 0.40 0.23 0.06
ROSCA Contributions in Last Year (in USD) 53.83 60.07 36.65 33.15
(72.88) (102.22) (58.36) (49.48)
Value of Animals Owned (in USD) 69.01 69.99 122.88 61.52
(132.62) (171.45) (612.20) (120.35)
Value of Durable Goods Owned (in USD) 71.13 126.30 269.57 123.48
(152.96) (131.36) (1054.84) (362.68)
Received Loan from Bank in Past Year
c 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
Risk Preferences
Percent invested in Risky Asset
d 0.64 0.59 0.63 0.72
Cognitive Skills
Raven's matrix score (percent correct) 0.49 - - 0.44
Observations 250 2390 2160 2252
a Data from (Dupas et al., 2012). 
b Data from ongoing projects by authors. 
cIn Uganda, this is coded as whether the respondent ever applied for a loan. 
d Size of risky asset varied across surveys:  Kenya - $1.25; Uganda - $0.44; Malawi - $0.80. The amount invested in the risky asset was multipled by 4 
with probability 0.5 and was lost with probability 0.5.
33Appendix: Robustness Checks
Excluding those who might have anticipated receiving a loan
Like many microﬁnance institutions, the village bank we worked with oﬀers both savings
and credit products. Once people have an account with the bank, they can become eligible
for a loan. To qualify for a loan, an individual must ﬁrst purchase a share in the bank. Three
months after purchasing a share, an individual is eligible to apply for a loan (the maximum
amount is a multiple of the amount of share capital owned). Clearly, if many treatment
individuals had gotten loans during the study period, this would likely bias our estimated
impacts of expanding access to savings alone. Since only a small number of individuals in
our sample actually got loans (only 1.6% of respondents got loans within a year), this is not
a major concern.
That said, it remains theoretically possible that some individuals in our treatment group
expected such loans in the future, and were able to borrow working capital from friends
and relatives in the short run, in anticipation of a bank loan (and presumably, higher future
proﬁts) later. This is probably very unlikely in this case, since it is diﬃcult for people to
access credit informally even if they have physical assets as collateral, and possible future
access to credit was not at all guaranteed by getting access to an account. Nevertheless, we
formally explore the impact of these individuals on our estimated impacts in Appendix Table
A3. In this Table, we replicate the analysis presented in Tables 3 and 4, after excluding from
the sample those who received a loan from the bank within a year after account opening (note
that this is overly strong, since the logbooks were collected 4-6 months after opening). This
reduces the sample size and increases the size of the standard errors, but all the coeﬃcients
have the same magnitude and sign as they do in Tables 3 and 4, suggesting that the eﬀects
observed on investment and expenditures are not driven by loans or the anticipation of loans.
Size of Deposits
As can be inferred from Figure 1, even those individuals who actively used the account did
not make many transactions. For instance, the median number of deposits made in the ﬁrst
6 months among respondents who actively used the account was just 4.6. This means that
the average deposit size was large: the median among active women was about 300 Ksh (US
$4.30), which is equivalent to about 1.6 days of mean expenditures for women in the sample.
For some women, the average deposit size was much larger than this.
By deﬁnition, those who make very large deposits must be able to save up at home, and
therefore should not particularly beneﬁt from the accounts. To check this, we run our main
34regressions while excluding those whose average deposit size was larger than the median
deposit in the sample. The results are presented in Appendix Table A4. Although removing
half of the treatment group considerably reduces statistical power, we obtain coeﬃcients on
the treatment eﬀects of similar magnitude in this speciﬁcation as in Tables 3 and 4.
35Table A3. Excluding Those Individuals that Were Planning for a Loan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trimming None None Top 5% None None None None None None
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Estimates (ITT)
Sampled for Savings Account 188.19 219.53 86.50 20.30 24.82 9.45 12.50 8.33 6.58
(106.09)* (150.66) (62.54) (15.46) (18.74) (6.14) (7.91) (3.72)** (3.90)*
Sampled for Savings Account * Boda -128.51 -25.56 -0.01 -5.43 7.25
(229.88) (86.20) (43.11) (14.74) (11.53)
Observations 240 240 240 246 246 246 246 246 246
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.077* 0.191 0.125 0.026**
p-value for effect for women = 0 0.146 0.168 0.187 0.115 0.093*
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.567 0.337 0.517 0.570 0.207
Panel B. Mean and Std. Dev. of Dependent Variable in Control Group
Female Vendors:   Mean 352.01 240.84 167.13 84.42 21.22
                             Std. Dev. (460.03) (224.20) (115.77) (48.19) (23.66)
Bodas:                   Mean 11.30 11.30 131.21 59.24 25.12
                             Std. Dev. (8.81) (8.81) (106.84) (31.43) (23.77)
Amount invested in Business Total Expenditures Food Expenditures Private Expenditures
Notes: See Table 2 notes.
36Table A4. Excluding Those Making Large Deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trimming None None Top 5% None None None None None None
Panel A. Intention-to-Treat Estimates (ITT)
Sampled for Savings Account 161.17 249.18 91.77 28.19 34.37 11.26 14.08 10.56 9.12
(133.64) (207.54) (77.90) (17.33) (21.40) (6.44)* (8.47)* (4.48)** (4.71)*
Sampled for Savings Account * Boda -306.72 -93.71 7.63 1.47 9.56
(242.83) (75.11) (48.23) (16.38) (13.19)
Observations 211 211 211 217 217 217 217 217 217
p-value for overall effect = 0 0.229 0.105 0.082* 0.019**
p-value for effect for women = 0 0.231 0.240 0.110 0.098* 0.054*
p-value for effect for bodas = 0 0.398 0.921 0.318 0.254 0.132
Panel B. Mean and Std. Dev. of Dependent Variable in Control Group
Female Vendors:   Mean 363.84 239.80 169.14 86.96 21.08
                             Std. Dev. (471.69) (222.03) (117.77) (54.96) (23.44)
Bodas:                   Mean 11.30 11.30 131.21 59.24 25.12
                             Std. Dev. (8.81) (8.81) (106.84) (31.43) (23.77)
Amount invested in Business Total Expenditures Food Expenditures Private Expenditures
Notes: See Table 2 notes.
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